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The purpose of this paper was to carry out a factor analysis of 23,968 responses 
by U.S Naval aviators to 12 items from the Command Safety Assessment Survey 
(CSAS), and identify whether there were differences in safety climate based upon rank or 
aviation community. Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis techniques it 
was possible to establish a stable two factor solution. For factor one (personnel 
leadership) no significant effects of rank or aviation community were found. For factor 
two (availability of resources) although there was not a significant main effect of rank, 
there was a significant main effect of aviation community, and a significant interaction. 
These significant findings were attributed to the unique mission of training squadrons and 




Safety climate describes employees' 
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and 
safety (Mearns & Flin, 1999). The most common 
method for measuring safety climate is through the 
use of a questionnaire. Many different safety 
climate measures have been developed and they 
have been used in a wide range of high-risk 
industries (see Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 
2000 for a discussion).  
Just as has been the case in other high risk 
industries, the U.S. Naval aviation community 
recognized that there was a need to develop a tool to 
assess safety climate, and provide feedback to 
squadron (a military aviation unit with a total of 12 
to 24 aircraft, depending on aircraft type) 
Commanding Officers (COs) on the state of safety. 
To achieve this goal the Command Safety 
Assessment Survey (CSAS) was developed by 
researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006). The 61-item 
CSAS is completed on-line, and responses are 
obtained for each item on a five point Likert scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A 
small number of additional questions elicit 
demographic and organizational data. The responses 
are anonymous. 
 The theoretical background underpinning the 
CSAS is based upon a conceptual Model of 
Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) that 
identified five major areas relevant to high risk 
organizations in managing risk and developing a 
climate to reduce accidents (Libuser, 1994). The 
five MOSE areas are:  
• process auditing– a system of ongoing checks 
to monitor hazardous conditions; 
• reward system– expected social compensation 
or disciplinary action to reinforce or correct 
behavior; 
• quality assurance– policies and procedures 
that promote high quality performance; 
• risk management– how the organization 
perceives risk and takes corrective action; and 
• command and control– policies, procedures, 
and communication processes used to mitigate 
risk. 
 
To date there have been three published 
studies that have utilized CSAS data (Desai et al, 
2006; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 
2003; Singer, Rosen, Zhao, Ciavarelli., & Gaba, 
2010). However, these studies did not report an 
analysis of the factor structure of the CSAS. The 
purpose of this paper is to report an evaluation of 
the construct validity (the extent to which the 
questionnaire measures what it is intended to 
measure) of the CSAS. The intention was to use the 
responses of 110,014 U.S. Naval aircrew collected 
over 10 years to all 61 CSAS items. However, as 
part of the data screening process it was necessary 
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variance across a large proportion of items, and the 
identification of substantial non-random 
measurement error. An examination of these issues 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but they are 
discussed extensively in Buttrey, O’Connor, O’Dea, 
and Kennedy (2010) and O’Connor, Buttrey, 
O’Dea, and Kennedy (under review).  
Therefore, this paper reports exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses of the 12 CSAS items 
and 23,968 responses for which we were confident 
that there was a lack of non-random measurement 
error. Comparisons of factor scores were also made 
based upon type of aircraft flown and rank of 
respondent.  
The reason for comparing responses on the 
basis of type of aircraft flown is that the mission, 
size of crew, and type of aircraft vary considerably 
across U.S. naval aviation. Moreover, apart from 
training aircraft, it is very rare for aviators to move 
between very different types of aircraft (e.g. 
helicopter to fighter aircraft). Therefore, it may be 
that there are differences in safety culture based 
upon the type of aircraft flown. The rationale 
behind comparing across rank is that shared 
perceptions about safety amongst managers and the 
workforce are an important feature of good safety 




Participants. Responses were obtained from 
23,968 U.S Naval aviators. Table 1 provides a 
summary of responses separated by rank and type of 
aircraft flown. Big wing aircraft are large transport 
and surveillance aircraft (e.g. C-130 Hercules, P-3 
Orion), TACAIR are Tactical Aviation, which 
includes multi-role fighter aircraft (e.g. F/A-18 
Hornet, E/A-8 Prowler) and rotary wing aircraft are 
helicopters (e.g. SH-60 Seahawk). Training aircraft 
and ‘other’ included a range of responses from 
individuals that are either not associated with a 
particular squadron or are attached to a very 










Junior Senior Junior Senior 
Big wing 1822 1976 2212 1479 
Rotary 2385 1234 3498 1275 
TACAIR 27 20 2193 1212 
Training 24 9 2042 432 
Other 348 284 427 428 
 
Analysis. The data was divided into two parts. We 
performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on 
the 47% of the data (10,968 cases) collected prior to 
1 January, 2008. The factor structure from the EFA 
was then used to carry out a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) with the remaining 12,476 cases 
from 2 January 2008 through July 2009. Once a 
stable factor structure was identified, comparisons 
were made of the factors scores on the basis of rank, 
and type of aircraft flown.  
As discussed extensively in Buttrey et al. 
(2010) and O’Connor et al. (under review), many 
respondents give the very same numeric response to 
almost all of the items. It was believed that a 
response of “4” given by a respondent who 
answered “3” to almost every question was quite 
different from a response of “4” given by a 
respondent who answered “5” to almost every 
question. So, each response was replaced by the 
difference between that response and the mode of 
the entire set of responses from that respondent in 
that survey. This modally adjusted item data will be 
used in the analysis reported in this paper. 
A limitation of the analyses is that the same 
participants have answered the survey multiple 
times. Therefore, it was necessary to assume that 
every survey is an independent reflection of the 
safety climate. 
The factor scores were derived using the 
“GLS” function that is calculated by EQS for 
Windows. GLS factor scores are described in 
Bentler and Yuan (1997). Two-way between 
subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used 
to examine whether there were significant main 
effects of rank or aircraft flown, and whether there 
were interactions between the two independent 
variables. 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis. Because only 12 
items were retained for analysis, we sought two 
factors. The usual χ2 test for model adequacy 
suggests that two factors were insufficient; the 
tested identified seven factors, which is the 
maximum possible. However, we chose to keep a 
two-factor solution for purposes of interpretability. 
The EFA resulted in two factors: ‘personnel 
leadership’ (items 4, 13, 16, 19, 9, 17, and 48), and 
‘availability of resources’ (items 31, 32, 50, 52, and 
55). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The 
two factors identified from the EFA were entered 
into a CFA using the second part of the data. The 
initial fit of the data was not found to be acceptable 
(χ2 = 24540, df = 66, p>0.05; CFI (robust) = 0.73; 
GFI = 0.93; and RMSEA (robust) = 0.08). 
However, by allowing the two factors to correlate, 
and allowing covariance of the error terms between 
items 31 and 32, and items 13 and 16 (as 
recommended by the Wald test and consistent with 
theory), an acceptable fit resulted (χ2 = 24540, df = 
66, p>0.05; CFI (robust) = 0.91; GFI = 0.97; and 
RMSEA(robust) = 0.047). The standardized 
solution is shown in Figure 1. The two-factor model 
was also found to be an acceptable fit for the 23,442 
cases used in the EFA. (χ2 = 45647, df = 66, 
p>0.05; CFI (robust) = 0.91; GFI = 0.97; and 
RMSEA(robust) = 0.047).  
 
Figure 1. CFA standardized solution. 
 
Between Groups Comparison. Figure 2 shows 
the average factor scores for factor one (left) and 
factor two (right), by aircraft flown. Figure 3 shows 
the average factor scores by rank. Vertical lines 
extend ± 2 standard deviations above and below the 
means.  
 
Figure 2. Average factor scores for factor one (left) 





















































































































Figure 3. Average factor scores for factor one (left) 
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For the personnel leadership factor there were 
not significant main effects of rank (F(3,23307)= 2.20, 
n.s.), or type of aircraft flown (F(4,23307)= 2.16, n.s.). 
The interaction also was not significant (F(12,23307)= 
1.26 n.s.). 
For factor two (availability of resources) there 
was not a significant main effect of rank (F(3,23307)= 
1.22, n.s.), but there was a significant main effect of 
type of aircraft flown (F(4,23307)= 4.42, p<.05), and a 
significant interaction between rank and type of 
aircraft flown (F(12,23307)= 2.10, p<.05). From Figure 
4 it can be seen that the interaction is due to the 
higher mean score of the junior officers in the 
training squadrons as compared to respondents who 
fly other types of aircraft (as can be seen from Table 
1, there are very low number of enlisted 
respondents from training squadrons). 
 
Figure 4. Mean factor score for factor two separated 
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Through EFA and CFA it was possible to 
establish a stable, two-factor structure. The two 
factors identified (personnel leadership and 
availability of resources) are consistent with the 
safety climate literature (see O’Connor, O’Dea, 
Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011). From examining the 
items that make up the two factors, it can be seen 
that their focus is on obtaining feedback on attitudes 
towards those individuals in leadership positions. A 
factor concerned with management is identified 
about 75% of the time in safety climate research 
(O’Connor et al, 2011). A ‘resources’ factor is also 
included in other aviation safety climate surveys 
(O’Connor et al, 2011). 
The lack of significant main effects of rank 
for the two factors suggests there are shared 
perceptions about safety amongst squadron aviators. 
Unlike the senior leadership in most high risk 
organizations, those with management level 
positions within U.S Naval aviation still must carry 
out the same task as the workforce- fly aircraft. As a 
result of this, the senior leadership in naval aviation 
are involved in work and safety activities, as well as 
frequent, informal communications with squadron 
members- all recognized as critical behaviors for 
safety. These interactions serve a number of useful 
functions: they demonstrate the managers’ concern 
for safety; serve as a frame of reference for the 
workforce to guide appropriate task behaviors; 
foster closer ties between managers, supervisors, 
and workers; encourage a free exchange of ideas on 
job improvement; and provide an opportunity for 
the early recognition of hazards and improper job 
practices (Cohen, 1977).  
That the junior officers in training squadrons 
were more positive on the ‘availability of resources’ 
factor than those that fly other types of aircraft may 
be attributed to the somewhat unique mission of the 
squadrons and junior officers in them. The sole 
mission of a training squadron is to train aviators. 
The student naval aviators follow a strict training 
curriculum, and flight time, resources, etc. are more 
controlled and protected than is generally the case 
in operational squadrons. 
Another, issue is that the majority of junior 
officers in training squadrons are inexperience 
student aviators focused on learning to fly. 
Therefore, arguably, they may not yet have the 
experience to provide an accurate assessment of the 
safety climate, nor are they involved in making 
decision about resources. Research on survey 
responses would suggest that this lack of knowledge 
is unlikely to lead to them failing to answer the 
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survey items concerned with these issues, and that 
they are more likely to respond more positively than 
negatively (see Krosnick, 1999 for more discussion 





Using EFA and CFA techniques we were 
able to identify a stable, two-factor structure, both 
of which have safety leadership at their core. The 
comparison across rank and type of aircraft flown 
suggests that there is a common safety culture 
across ranks and between squadrons that fly 
different aircraft. The difference between junior 
aviators in training squadrons was attributed to the 
unique mission of training squadrons and the junior 
officers in them. 
In future work, we will use the factor scores 
from the two factors to assess whether the responses 
from individuals in squadrons in which mishaps 
took place differ from the responses from those 
individuals in squadrons with no mishaps. If the 
factor scores really reflect aspects of safety climate 
that contribute to mishaps, then it may be possible 
to detect (and alert) squadrons at higher risk of 
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